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Abstract
Donors hope that their foreign aid can be influential, far beyond the development projects that 
they fund. Frequently, aid providers attach political conditions to their monies in the hope that 
these demands can serve as catalysts to improve the governance in the recipient. This is called a 
political conditionality approach. Few countries have felt the weight of conditionality as much 
as Malawi did in the 1990s. Here, donors were able to use aid sanctions to successfully encourage 
democratization, while strengthening the demands of domestic opposition forces. This paper 
argues that three factors were critical in this process: 1) aid dependency, 2) donor coordination, 
and 3) a strong and persistent domestic opposition. With their combined weight, foreign donors 
and Malawian civil society were able to change the tide in this once highly authoritarian country.
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General Introduction
A political conditionality approach seeks to move leaders in authoritarian 
countries to adopt democratic reforms by using donor aid as both a carrot and 
a stick. In such an action, foreign assistance functions as leverage to support 
democratization in the aid beneficiary. The bargain is straightforward: recipi-
ents can begin applying the required changes and continue receiving aid, or 
they ignore donor demands and foreign assistance will be cut back. Since the 
early 1990s this method of persuasion has been deployed in a widespread man-
ner by most donors.
Political conditionality ties economic aid to democratization (including 
multiparty elections, increased checks on executive power, good governance, 
transparency, the rule of law, and respect for human rights) (Nelson and 
Eglinton 1992: 26-32). These reforms are traded for future economic support. 
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Under such a relationship, “the donor sets certain conditions to be met by the 
recipient as a prerequisite for entering into an aid agreement or for keeping up 
aid . . . Foreign aid is used as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor . . .” 
(Stokke 1995: 11-13). Furthermore, political conditionality is most frequently 
viewed as a coercive incentive, or even a punishment (i.e., aid suspension) for 
undesired conduct (Rothchild 1997: 102). As Rothchild indicates, “A coercive 
incentive employs a mix of threats and punishments to induce a change of 
preferences from the target state . . . leading to compliance with a proposed 
course of action” (Rothchild 1997: 103). This is an essential part of this form of 
donor influence.
In this study, I argue that a political conditionality approach can promote 
democratization in certain cases, under specific circumstances – primarily, 
high levels of aid dependence in the recipient, the presence of close inter-donor 
coordination, along with a strong and persistent domestic opposition inside the 
aid beneficiary. The goal here is to provide a better understanding of the factors 
that influence the success or failure of a political conditionality approach by 
using the experience of Malawi during the 1990s as a critical case-study. Over-
all, I ask if political conditionality can be a useful tool capable of facilitating 
democratization in aid recipients. The objective is to illustrate how the above 
mentioned explanatory variables interact and impact the overall effectiveness 
of the application of political conditionality. This study will be divided into 
four parts: 1) the compatibility of domestic and external influences on democ-
ratization, 2) research design and methodology, 3) the some key background 
concerning Malawi, and 4) an analysis of the critical hypotheses in regards to 
the democratization process in Malawi during the time-period in question.
The Compatibility of International and Domestic Influences  
on Democratization
Democratization1 is a complex process involving the interaction of agency and 
structural factors, along with domestic as well as international influences. It is 
particularly difficult to discern which sort of pressure, international or domestic, 
or some combination of two, was at work in any given democratic transition 
1 Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, measured by the level of political and existence and strength 
of executive constraints, provides a basic framework for understanding democracy as used in 
this study. Along these lines, in this study, democratization is used to refer to liberal political 
change that includes the following elements: 1) the adoption of representative political institu-
tions, 2) regular, free and fair, multiparty elections, and 3) political space for opposition and civil 
society. For further information on democracy and democratization in Africa, see also Tukumbi 
Lumumba-Kasongo (Ed.) Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa: Political Dysfunction and the 
Struggle for Social Progress, South Africa, Pretoria: UNISA; Senegal, Dakar: CODESRIA and United 
Kingdom, London: Zed Books, 2005 and 2006.
 N. G. Emmanuel / African and Asian Studies 12 (2013) 415-434 417
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 182). Nonetheless, most of the literature on 
democratization focuses on domestic reasons behind reform. But I argue that 
while domestic factors are critical, they can be greatly strengthened by the 
behavior of external actors.
Domestic Influences
Much of the academic debate centers on the role of domestic factors in demo-
cratic change. As Claude Ake argues, “democratization is not something that 
one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not 
happen” (Ake 1991: 38). Addressing the dramatic political changes that swept 
across Africa in the 1990s, Naomi Chazan indicates that “domestic explanations 
lie at the root of the new political climate on the continent . . .” (Chazan 1992: 
281). Furthermore, directly arguing against a political conditionality approach, 
Peter Uvin states that “foreign aid cannot substitute for the presence of internal 
forces . . .” (Uvin, 1998: 237). Along these same lines, Bratton and van de Walle 
argue that one of the best measures of a potentially successful democratiza-
tion is the frequency and magnitude of organized anti-government protests. 
They also point out that democratization and “competitive elections almost 
always occurred wherever there was extensive protest . . .” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997: 221). The frequency of anti-government protests should be able to 
serve as a broad proxy for overall strength of the opposition and their ability 
to mobilize domestic support. It clearly makes sense that outside influence is 
not a sufficient substitute for genuine commitment to reform on the part of 
governments and other domestic actors (Smith: 1997). But, it may help.
Adding External Pressures and Incentives
As is argued in this paper, Gordon Crawford concludes that “. . . external 
intervention is more successful when it combines with the internal pressure 
exerted by an active political opposition . . .” (Crawford 2001: 201). That is to say, 
domestic and international pressures combine to make a powerful voice for 
change. Foreign pressure will be most successful when combined with strong 
internal opposition. The deployment of external aid conditionality may not be 
sufficient enough to induce political reform on its own, but it can be a critical 
force multiplier for domestic opposition groups, sending clear signals of inter-
national support and emboldening the local actors. The synthesis between the 
local and the international creates a potent force for change. Michael Bratton 
and Nicolas van de Walle also claim that, “. . . the onset of African regime tran-
sitions was driven principally from within but against a background of political 
and economic influences from abroad” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 151). 
As argued here “External pressure should be viewed as providing extra support 
for already powerful internal pressure” (Wiseman 1994: 441).
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Methodological Approach
Political conditionality is considered to be effective when the target pursues 
the path towards democratization. Being the case, this study focuses identify-
ing what democratic reforms take place, when and to what extent (Uvin 1993: 
67). When implemented, these political changes should be obvious in readily 
available data sources such as those published regularly by organizations like 
Freedom House. Although such ready-made indicators are far from perfect and 
at times overlook critical events and evolutions, they should be able to provide 
us with a suitable compass, pointing out the general direction of democratic 
change. This study operationalizes Freedom House’s political rights scores as a 
central part of its outcome variable. The emphasis is placed on change in Free-
dom House political rights scores after the application of aid sanctions related 
to a political conditionality approach by the major donors states. For example, 
in Malawi, Freedom House political rights scores dramatically improved from 
1992 (i.e., year of the imposition of donor conditionality and the beginning of 
opposition protests) to 1994 (i.e., the year of multiparty elections), with a four-
point change from a score of six (i.e., authoritarian – “not free”) to a score of 
two (i.e., democratic – “free”). Figure 1 below demonstrates the dramatic mag-
nitude of the democratization process.
In the time period in question for this study, from 1990 to 1999, four of 
Malawi’s major donors applied significant aid cuts: the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Japan, and Germany. Five other minor donors also reduced their 
assistance: Denmark, France, Portugal, Italy, and Canada. The aggregate with-
Figure 1
Malawi Freedom House “Political Rights” Score (1990-1999)
Source: Freedom House
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1990 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Multiparty
Elections
Conditionality
Imposed
1=
M
os
t F
re
e, 
7=
Le
as
t F
re
e
1992 1994
 N. G. Emmanuel / African and Asian Studies 12 (2013) 415-434 419
drawal of economic assistance is clear from the aid distribution in the 1990s 
from all OECD/DAC donors, seen in Figure 2 below.
The United Kingdom along with the United States, Japan and Germany 
moved collectively to suspend project and program aid from 1992 to 1993. Only 
humanitarian aid was continued in order to confront the severe drought hit-
ting the Southern African subregion. During the period, total OECD/DAC aid to 
Malawi dropped from $263.7 million to $203.7 million, or a downturn of about 
a 25%. This downturn significantly impacted Malawi and its economy, due to 
the high levels of aid dependency (i.e., Aid/GDP). The application of condition-
ality and the related drop in foreign assistance is most evident in the downturn 
in aid flows from Great Britain, especially in 1992 and 1993, compared with the 
baseline of 1990-1991. As the lead donor in applying aid sanctions, British aid 
declined by 58% over the years in question, from $50.5 million in 1991to a low 
of $21.3 million in 1993. However, why did this downturn in donor assistance 
matter and how did this eventually lead to a significant shift towards democra-
tization in the Malawian regime?
Key Explanatory Variables
Three critical factors influence the success of a political conditionality 
approach in Malawi and elsewhere: aid dependence, donor coordination, and 
the strength of domestic demands for democracy. Each of these explanatory 
Figure 2
Total aid from all OECD Donors (1990-1999)
Source: OECD Library
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variables strengthens the impact of this particular foreign policy tool available 
to donors.
1. Aid Dependence
Aid dependence can be defined as a situation in which a country cannot per-
form many of the core functions of government or the delivery of basic public 
services without foreign aid funding and expertise (Brautigam 2000: 2). This 
critical catalytic factor (measured in economic aid as a part of Gross National 
Product) is perhaps the most straightforward hypothesis presented in the con-
ditionality relationship. According to Gordon Crawford, “the degree of effec-
tiveness of political conditionality will be in direct proportion to the degree 
of aid dependency” (Crawford 2001: 202). It would be logical to assume that “a 
highly aid dependent country should be receptive to demands for change in 
return for assistance” (Foster and Jennifer 2001: 11). Over-reliance on foreign 
assistance can make peripheral economies especially vulnerable to donor aid 
sanctions (Uvin 1998: 237, Brautigam 2000: 24). Also, as Zartman points out, 
aid dependency can widen power asymmetries between the donor and the 
recipient, thus facilitating conditionality (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 85). This 
leaves such countries with little room to bargain with donors. Furthermore, 
Olav Stokke stresses that at higher levels of aid dependency even minimal 
reductions in aid may destabilize the recipient government (Stokke 1995: 44). 
Simply put, these countries need the money and can be expected to do almost 
anything demanded of them in order to keep aid flowing in. This is illustrated 
by the following general hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Highly aid dependent regimes should not be able to refuse donor 
 demands for reform, strengthening conditionality.
However, aid dependency can be a double-edged sword, perhaps undermining 
conditionality instead of increasing its potential to facilitate democratization. 
Some development economists argue that aid dependent regimes are highly 
unlikely to reform under any circumstance. Stephan Knack points out that 
“Aid dependence can potentially undermine . . . pressures to reform” (Knack 
2000). Arguing along the same lines Brautigam indicates that “Aid dependence 
can make reforms less likely to occur” (Brautigam 2000: 6-7). High levels of 
aid dependency, along their lines of reasoning, significantly undermine the 
aid recipient’s capacity to carry out reforms (Azam and O’Connell: 1999). This 
leads to an alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b: Highly aid dependent regimes lack the capacity to reform, undermining 
 conditionality.
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Aid dependency can be measured by determining the overall size of Official 
Development Aid (ODA) as a part of Gross National Product (GNP), expressed 
as the ratio ODA/GNP (Stokke 1995: 44, Knack 2000). These data are readily 
available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
2. Donor Coordination
As with sanctions, how does a coordinated, multilateral effort by donors to 
impose conditionalities impact democratization? A coordinated approach 
to conditionality among several key donors, presents a more significant pres-
sure than a unilateral effort (Stokke 1995: 45, Crawford 2001: 205). This type of 
inter-donor cooperation demonstrates the seriousness and credibility of their 
threats, and should increase the pressure on the recipient (Lancaster 1999). 
Olav Stokke hypothesizes that close cooperation between several key donors 
presents a more significant pressure on an errant regime than a unilateral 
effort (Stokke 1995: 63). This leads to the following argument:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of donors imposing aid sanctions should have 
a positive impact on the effectiveness of political conditionality to 
encourage democratization in the targeted aid recipient.
It would seem logical, as Crawford points out, that a coordinated approach 
among several key donors would present a more significant pressure on an 
errant regime than a unilateral effort (Crawford 2001: 205). It is obvious that 
donors could clearly increase their leverage on aid recipients by ganging up 
on them. Such an international effort demonstrates the seriousness and cred-
ibility of donor threats, and should increase the pressure on the recipient in 
most cases (Lancaster 1999, Stokke 1995). Donor cooperation should increase 
the effectiveness of conditionality. Scholars such as Stokke and Crawford make 
a very forceful argument that when donors work together in applying political 
conditionalities the probability of political reform among aid recipients should 
go up dramatically (Stokke 1995: 45, Crawford 2001: 205). Aid recipients simply 
have nowhere to turn for precious foreign assistance.
Yet, getting major international donors to work together is not as easy as 
one might seem. Key aid donors with close ties frequently let their perceived 
national interests get in the way of seriously applying conditionalities (Emman-
uel 2010; Emmanuel 2013). Furthermore, “donors are not uniform or consistent 
in applying the modern political agenda . . .” (Burnell 1997: 121). Donors focus 
on different issues related to democratization, making harmonization of con-
ditionalities rather difficult. This overall lack of consistency and focus amongst 
donors undermines conditionality (Crawford 1995, Crawford 1997). As Boyce 
argues, “. . . in the absence of inter-donor coordination, aid recipients can be 
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expected to shop around for offers of assistance with a minimum of strings 
attached . . .” (Boyce 2002: 23). If donors are divided, a targeted aid recipient 
could play the donors off against each other and potentially subvert condition-
ality. Two of the prominent impediments obstruct donor cooperation. These 
factors include: 1) the lack of collective donor institutions to coordinate their 
activities, and 2) commitment problems faced by donors.
One of the clearest weaknesses undermining inter-donor cooperation is the 
lack of international institutions that can effectively coordinate the implemen-
tation of aid conditionalities (Burnell 1997: 121). One could cite the existence 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was established in 1960 
as a forum for consultations among donors on major aid questions. Certainly, 
the DAC has mainly focused on two issues burden sharing and improving aid 
effectiveness, but it has not been a very efficient tool for mobilizing donors and 
coordinating donor efforts. The DAC provides little more of than an occasional 
forum for discussions among donors and a clearing-house for data on aid and 
developing countries generally, it hardly represents a serious body capable of 
coordinating the activities of rich country donors (Dijkstra 2002). However, 
the most successful efforts to unify donors have been the World Bank’s ad hoc 
“Consultative Groups”, as was the case with Malawi in the early 1990s. But this 
does not translate into any type of permanent institutional arrangement.
The major side effect of an ad-hoc approach is that there exists no uniform 
framework, criteria or agenda for political conditionality (Burnell 1997: 121). 
Such inconsistencies among donors can undermine their policies. Aid recipi-
ents identify these differences and rightfully try to court donors that are hes-
itant in applying conditionality. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to get 
donors to sanction an aid recipient that they have close ties with. Donor-state’s 
frequently let their national interests guide their foreign aid policies. This study 
identifies two sources motivating collective, coordinated pressure by donors. 
First, the trends of Net ODA (by individual donors and by all OECD donors 
overall) can be examined for all cases so as to identify clear drops in aid around 
critical dates. Second the overall number of key donors that impose aid reduc-
tions are critical in identifying coordination.
3. Strength of Domestic Opposition Protest
For most scholars who study democratization, political reform can only be suc-
cessful in the presence of a strong, organized domestic opposition (Sandbrook 
1986: 319-332, Kunz 1991: 224, Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Sandbrook 1993, 
Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993, Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 182, Smith 1997, 
Carothers 1998: 96, Uvin 1998: 237). There is no real substitute for a genuine 
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domestic desire for change. Esteemed political scientist Claude Ake tried to 
explain why: “Like development, democratization is not something that one 
people does for another. People must do it for themselves . . .” (Ake 1991: 38). 
Continuing on this same point, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle 
argue that one of the best measures of a potentially successful democratic tran-
sition is the frequency and magnitude of organized anti-government protests. 
As they point out, transitions to democratic polities with “competitive elec-
tions almost always occurred wherever there was extensive protest” (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997: 221). Therefore, one cannot escape discussing democ-
ratization without referring to local oppositions and their ability to organize 
anti-government sentiment. This issue has also come to the attention of con-
ditionality scholars such as Gordon Crawford, who indicates that “. . . external 
intervention is more successful when it combines with the internal pressure 
exerted by an active political opposition” (Crawford 2001: 201). This project 
also holds the hypothesis that a strong and active domestic political opposi-
tion can be strengthened by international pressure and increase the likelihood 
of reform.
Hypothesis 3: Donor aid conditionalities will most effective in the presence of strong 
domestic protest against a given authoritarian regime.
The protest data used to construct this variable can be derived from the Social 
Conflict in Africa Database. The frequency and number of civilian deaths will 
determine the strength of opposition protests.
Democratization in Malawi
In the early 1990’s, Malawi represented an “island of stasis” in an Africa sub-
merged in a massive, continent-wide movement towards multiparty democ-
racy” (Africa Confidential 20 December 1991). This wave of reform that hit the 
region was so widespread that by the end 1990’s almost all sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries had adopted multiparty constitutions, abandoning the single-
party state model. As these momentous changes swept across the continent, 
Malawi’s leadership struggled to stay afloat against the tide of change in the 
face of pressure from its domestic opponents and an increasingly aggressive 
international community.
Democratization in Malawi was subject to significant pressure from donors 
applying a conditionality approach to their aid, and was bolstered by a strong 
reform-minded domestic opposition. According to Crawford, Malawi presents 
a case in which aid “sanctions made a significant contribution” to the country’s 
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overall process of democratization (Crawford 2001: 187). As will be demon-
strated here, President Hastings Kamaza Banda’s regime responded clearly 
and quickly to a combination of donor and domestic pressures. Banda found 
himself under siege from above and below, from home and abroad. Given its 
extremely high level of external aid dependency, post-Cold War lack of foreign 
donor allies, and a growing internal pro-democratic opposition, Malawi under-
went rapid political change from 1992 to 1994. Along with the changes of the 
position of Malawi in the international system, key domestic factors led the 
initial shift away from authoritarianism in Malawi.
Malawi’s remarkable democratization was sparked by a group of Catholic 
bishops in the spring of 1992, shortly before donor aid sanctions. The domestic 
push for change began with what is referred to as the Pastoral Lenten Letter read 
from pulpits across the country on 8 March 1992. The Pastoral letter was issued 
during the Catholic season of Lent. It was entitled “Living Our Faith”, and was 
signed by the entire upper hierarchy of the Malawian Catholic Church, one of 
the largest spiritual communities in the country (Newell 1995: 245). The reading 
of the Pastoral Letter went on to inspire a widespread opposition movement 
that would eventually replace Banda’s authoritarian regime with a multiparty 
democracy. The letter presented a biting criticism of the country’s leadership 
and called for a political opening (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 March 1992). 
The bishops’ message quickly went beyond Malawi’s estimated three million 
Catholics, as it was faxed, copied, and handed out across the country. The lid 
of dissent had been removed permanently. The collapse of Banda’s regime 
had begun.
The Malawian government took the Pastoral Letter as a direct threat. They 
saw the Catholic Church as the only organization capable of penetrating the 
rural countryside and getting its message of dissatisfaction across to a wide 
audience. The regime immediately moved to silence what it perceived as sedi-
tious rivals. Two days later, on 10 March 1992, Malawi’s eight Catholic bishops 
were arrested (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 March 1992). In Malawi, the imme-
diate reaction was that attendance at Catholic masses grew dramatically after 
the reading of the letter, beyond the size of that particular religious commu-
nity in the country.
At the time of the publication of the Pastoral Letter by Malawi’s Catholic 
bishops, a number of exiled members of the political opposition were meeting 
in Lusaka, Zambia to demand for a new political direction in their country. For-
mer political prisoner and trade union militant, Chakufwa Chihana emerged 
as their leader. Chihana, the secretary-general of the Southern African Trade 
Union Congress, a regional body representing some 10 million workers in a 
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dozen Southern African nations, returned from exile to challenge the Banda 
regime on 6 April 1992. Upon his return to the Malawian capital, Lilongwe, 
he was immediately stopped by the security forces at the airport and arrested 
for reading a statement demanding a referendum on the future of the Banda 
regime and declaring the formation of an opposition movement to challenge 
the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the sole legal political party (van 
Donge, 1995). This was an illegal act under Malawian law, and Chihana was 
charged with treason.
Before leaving for Malawi, Chihana told journalists that “I am prepared to 
die to advance the cause of democracy in my country (Africa Research Bulletin 
1-31 April 1992). Chihana’s arrest instantly became a symbol for both the inter-
nal and external opponents of the Banda regime and his court appearances 
became targets of regular antigovernment demonstrations. Donors immedi-
ately reacted to Chihana’s detention. The United States Department of State 
issued a statement condemning his arrest, calling it a “serious concern”, while 
British diplomats called for his immediate release (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 
April 1992).
Chihana’s act of public defiance against the Banda regime followed the tone 
set by the bishops only a few weeks earlier. However, other internal opposi-
tion activists decided to organize in a more clandestine manner, mainly out 
of fear. The primary group was the United Democratic Front (UDF), whose 
leadership kept secret, but was said at the time to have a broad following, 
even among some in the upper echelons of the ruling MCP (Africa Confidential 
22 May 1992). They began a campaign of distributing leaflets across the country 
calling for immediate reforms, including multiparty elections. In an attempt to 
stop this, the police began to seize fax machines, photocopiers, computers, and 
typewriters from offices, schools, and anyone else with the equipment.
In the months that followed a series of antigovernment demonstrations 
swept across the country. Several of these manifestations descended into riots 
and widespread looting in the cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe, especially tar-
geting businesses owned by President Hastings Kamaza Banda and leaders 
of the ruling party. The government reacted repressively and led to a crack-
down on a wide-scale basis. The universities were closed and any protests 
were violently suppressed (van Donge 1995: 230). In the events, more than 
40 people were reported killed and 125 injured as paramilitary police opened fire 
on the large crowds involved in the demonstrations (Africa Research Bulletin 
1-31 April 1992).
On 18 October 1992, only five months after the emergence of vocal oppo-
sition accompanied by donor demands for democratic reform and, President 
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Hastings Kamaza Banda went on the national radio and announced that he 
had decided that the a referendum would be held to determine if Malawi 
should turn to multiparty system or remain a one-party state. In his speech, he 
expressed confidence that Malawians would continue to support the regime 
he had founded. 
The Role of External Aid Providers
The timing of Banda’s announcement clearly had a foreign audience in mind. 
A World Bank Consultative Group meeting, an ad hoc body designed to coor-
dinate donor action against Malawi, was to take place later in October 1992. 
In reaction to Banda’s decision to hold a referendum, Baroness Linda Chalker, 
the British Overseas Aid Minister, indicated that Western donors would not 
resume aid to Malawi until lasting political changes had taken place. A referen-
dum was only the beginning in a more significant, long-term process of democ-
ratization. Chalker said that the current suspension of aid to Malawi would 
remain in place and was vital in bringing about democratic changes there 
(African Research Bulletin 1-30 September 1992). This remained the donor’s line 
even after Banda’s surprise announcement of the referendum.
The freezing of international economic assistance began to hit Malawi 
almost immediately. On the economic front, conditionality led within the first 
month to a foreign exchange crisis, a devaluation of the Malawian currency, 
the kwacha, by 22%, and the resignation of the governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi. The removal of donor assistance in 1992 led the Malawian economy to 
rapidly contract by an annual rate of 7.33%, the worst annual downturn since 
independence (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012). To stave off 
an eminent collapse, the regime quickly began looking for alternative sources 
of foreign assistance and turned to North Korea and China, to little avail (Africa 
Confidential 22 May 1992). This economic decline led to some unexpected 
problems for the aid suppliers. The question that was posed by donors was 
how long can aid be removed from Malawi without causing a total meltdown 
of the economy and potentially a humanitarian disaster? Nonetheless, donors 
maintained their aid sanction. Aid would only recommence when “substantive 
progress has been made” (Agence France Presse 22 June 1993).
Presidential Elections
On 17 May 1994, thirty years of one-party, authoritarian rule came to an end 
with the holding of Malawi’s multiparty presidential elections. In only months 
of official existence, it seems amazing that the opposition movements were 
ready for the highly complicated task of competing in a national election. The 
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political formations had little time to develop a national constituency and the 
electorate was pressed to become familiar with the numerous candidates and 
their platforms. Some observers of the transition have even gone so far as to say 
that it was as if the election was run in a political vacuum. (Kaspin, 1995, p. 611) 
Perhaps even more incredible is the fact that the former ruling party the MCP 
and the former President for Life Banda lost the election (see the figure below) 
and accepted the results without any serious contestation, fraud, or violence.
As with the referendum, the results of the presidential poll also had a regional 
bias: AFORD took the North, UDF won mainly in the South, and Banda was 
overwhelmingly victorious in the Center. This shows the MCP regime’s close 
engagement with people in the Center region to the detriment of the North 
and the South. Unfortunately for Banda, the majority of the population lives 
outside the Center. The opposition was split between AFORD behind the trade 
unionist Chakufwa Chihana, mostly returned exiles, and the UDF candidate 
Bakili Muluzi. Finally, it is important to point out that Muluzi did not secure an 
outright majority, gaining only 47.15% in the presidential election of 1994.
Perhaps most amazingly, Banda and the MCP accepted defeat and handed 
power to Muluzi and his UDF party. Multiparty democracy had taken root in 
Malawi with this peaceful transfer of power. The conditionality approach pur-
sued by donors had emboldened domestic opposition forces to push for real 
democratic reform in Malawi.
Figure 3
17 May 1994 Presidential Election Results
Source: African Elections Database
Hastings Kamuzu
Banda (MCP)
33.44%
Chakufwa Chihana
(AFORD)
18.89%Kamlepo Kalua (MDP)
0.52%
Bakili Muluzi (UDF)
47.15%
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Empirical Findings
Given the four hypotheses presented earlier, this next section examines 
Malawi’s democratization process and the role of external and domestic actors 
in this country’s dramatic transformation.
Aid Dependency
Aid matters to Malawi, and therefore it makes sense to argue that donor condi-
tions on that aid should matter as well. The removal of economic assistance 
undermines Malawi’s government and its economy. This dependency on for-
eign assistance dramatically increased for the Southern African country after 
the mid-1980’s, making Malawi one of the most aid dependent countries in 
the world. In the decade from 1990 to 1999, foreign economic assistance rep-
resented an average of more than a quarter of Malawi’s Gross National Prod-
uct. In 1992, annual development assistance accounted for a total of $63.69 per 
person. Given an annual GNP per capita of around only $200, the loss of these 
resources could definitely have negative consequences. This level of extreme 
dependency on foreign assistance certainly meant that donor actions should 
leave an impression on the behavior of Malawi’s leadership.
Furthermore, as a percentage of central government expenditures, eco-
nomic assistance to Malawi rose from 32% in 1985 to an unbelievable 105% 
only five years later in 1990. Aid not only matters to Malawi, it is crucial to the 
country.
Donor Coordination: World Bank Consultative Group
One of the central findings of political conditionality literature is that coordi-
nated action between donors, especially the top aid contributors, can send a 
Figure 4
Malawi’s Aid Dependency (Aid/GNP)
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators
28.57
22.30
27.29
21.41
13.61
24.40 25.10
36.7540
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Ai
d/
GN
P
1990 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 19991992 1994
24.26
29.80
 N. G. Emmanuel / African and Asian Studies 12 (2013) 415-434 429
strong message to an errant aid recipient. In the case examined here, the pri-
mary donor, Great Britain, moved to sanction some of its aid to Malawi because 
of its poor human rights record shortly before the distribution of the Pastoral 
Letter and the arrest of Chihana. In 1991 at a meeting of European Community 
development ministers, British Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda 
Chalker, Malawi had been informed “that Britain expected greater political 
freedom and respect for human rights” (Africa Confidential 20 December 1991). 
Other aid providers, however, did not immediately follow this move. But, after 
the bishop’s letter and Chihana’s arrest, donors collectively began to run out of 
patience with Banda and his ruling clique. As the donor community began to 
react, the Banda regime began to breakdown.
In response to the Malawian government’s crackdown on opposition lead-
ers and protests in the spring of 1992, many Western donors began to call for 
an aid freeze at the World Bank organized Paris Consultative Group meeting 
of bilateral donors on 11 May 1992 (Lobe 1992). Generally, the aid supplying 
countries were increasingly in agreement that they should use their assistance 
to leverage better human rights behavior and reform towards political plural-
ism. To compound the problem, the situation in Malawi would worsen only 
days before the donors’ conference, pushing their hand even more. About a 
week before the donor meeting, on 5 May 1992, a strike at a textile plant in the 
country’s commercial center of Blantyre descended into antigovernment street 
demonstrations and looting which was violently suppressed by the security 
forces. Reports out Malawi indicated that 38 had been killed by police in the 
two days of unrest (Holman 1992). The overly aggressive behavior of the para-
military police particularly caught the attention of the donors, and for some 
represented the final straw in their decision to apply further aid sanctions.
As a result of Banda’s heavy-handedness and his reluctance to institute 
political reforms, and after close consultations, donors met to discuss a reac-
tion to the situation in the country and future aid allocations to Malawi. The 
World Bank-chaired Consultative Group was widely attended with delegations 
from the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, France, the United States, 
Japan, Portugal, the African Development Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the International Fund for the Development 
of Agriculture and the United Nations Development Program. Representa-
tives from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the World Food 
Program, as well as observers from Italy, Canada and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development were also present. The large num-
ber of donors present at the gathering strengthened their decisions and cer-
tainly made a significant impression on the Malawian leadership. The group 
of donors announced the suspension of all bilateral, non-humanitarian assis-
tance to the government of Malawi. Only humanitarian aid would continue to 
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help fight the consequences of the drought and to assist the Mozambican refu-
gees in the country. This decision was put into effect for six months, pending 
a clear sign of improvement in the human rights situation and the undertak-
ing of political reforms. “Donors are seeking tangible and irreversible evidence 
of a basic transformation in the way Malawi approaches basic freedoms and 
human rights,” according to a World Bank statement issued in Paris (Richburg 
1992). Donors stated that dialogue with Malawi would resume as soon as the 
government in Lilongwe “presents proof of having taken concrete measures 
with respect to human rights and the democratization of political life,” stated 
the World Bank Director for Southern Africa, Stephen Denning (Inter-Press 
Service 13 May 1992). Denning said in a separate statement after the meeting 
that donors were “looking for action, rather than reassurances” (Hall 1992). The 
emergent domestic opposition in Malawi supported this move. In line with 
a conditionality approach, they “called on Western aid donors to freeze dis-
bursement of money unless Dr. Banda’s government met a series of demands 
ranging from the freeing of political prisoners to the revocation of the section 
of the constitution that makes Dr. Banda’s Malawi Congress the sole legal polit-
ical organization” (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 March 1992).
This concerted effort on the part of donors, combined with the high levels of 
aid dependence in Malawi, sent a clear signal to the Banda regime that changes 
had to be made. This external pressure for democratization was considerably 
strengthened by stance presented by the domestic opposition.
Domestic Opposition
As discussed earlier, most of the literature concerning democratic transitions 
focuses on domestic factors, almost completely ignoring international influ-
ences or any combination of the two (Bratton and van de Walle 1992, Cha-
zan,1992, Riley 1992, Boke, 1997, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Joseph 1997). 
The primary catalyst according to these scholars for political reform is the 
presence of a strong, organized domestic opposition. Therefore, one cannot 
escape discussing democratization without referring oppositions in some 
way. As Crawford indicates “. . . external intervention is more successful when 
it combines with the internal pressure exerted by an active political opposi-
tion” (Crawford 2001: 201). As a consequence, this project holds that a strong 
and active domestic political opposition can be strengthened by international 
pressure and have an increased likelihood of reform. The annual frequency of 
domestic opposition protests and the number of deaths associated with these 
activities serve as a rough proxy for the magnitude of anti-regime opposition in 
Malawi. The results can be seen in Table 1.
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Table 1 
Frequency of Protest Activity and Civilian Deaths in Malawi, 1990-1999 
(Source: SCAD)
Annual Number of Protests Annual Civilian Deaths in Protests
1990 1 20
1991 0 0
1992 9 78
1993 8 23
1994 4 0
1995 8 0
1996 1 0
1997 2 0
1998 5 0
1999 9 5
From this data, one can easily discern that the number of annual protest and 
the number of associated civilian deaths increases dramatically during the time 
period in question (1992-1993). The Banda regime tried to repress the opposi-
tion in 1992, killing 78 civilians in nine major demonstrations in the process. 
However, opposition activists kept up the momentum through 1993. This inter-
nal, pro-reform opposition combined with pressure from the international 
donor community combined to send a strong signal to the Banda regime, and 
eventually to topple it.
Conclusion
Malawi represents a successful case of the application of a political condition-
ality approach by donors. However, this considerable external pressure added 
strength to a vibrant domestic opposition. Donors were able to use their eco-
nomic assistance to leverage democratization in an extremely intransigent 
authoritarian regime. Three critical factors identified in this study clearly 
assisted this momentous political transition. The key variables include: close 
inter-coordination of donor action, extremely high levels of aid dependence, 
and a highly determined domestic opposition.
Yet there are shortcomings to such a conditionality approach. Admittedly, 
over the years the democratization process in Malawi has been difficult to 
maintain. The omnipresent obstacles of deep patronage networks, clientelism 
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and corruption are only a few of the elements that have undermined the 
democratization process in Malawi since the move towards multiparty rule in 
the mid-1990s. While aid conditions were sufficient for donors to apply pres-
sure for a political transition at that time, their aid sanctions were not able 
to help Malawi consolidate and deepen democracy. Nonetheless, in Malawi, 
aid conditionality from the primacy donors appeared to have bolstered the 
domestic pro-democracy opposition and their push to topple a highly recalci-
trant authoritarian regime from power.
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